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Saturday, September 19, 2026
Troy Jackson to Stun Maine Democrats in Breezy Win?
Collins was first elected to the Senate for Maine in 1996, meaning the sixth-term-seeking incumbent has served a whopping 30 years and is now the seventh-most-senior senator. In the 21st century, she has regularly won reelection by 20+ points despite Maine’s increasingly liberal tilt. In 2020, though, Collins beat then-Maine House Speaker Sara Gideon by “only” 8.6 points. (Thanks to the quirks of Maine’s ranked-choice voting system, I would say this is better measured as conservative-aligned candidates beating liberal-aligned candidates by about 5 points; but I digress.) The result was a remarkable polling miss and a gobsmacked Democratic Party as Biden carried the state by 8.7 points at the presidential level. This victory was likely due in part to Amy Coney Barrett. Just eight days before Election Day, Collins became the only Republican senator to vote against confirming Barrett to the Supreme Court—a conspicuous break with her party that may have revitalized the bipartisan appeal on which she had built her career. Nonetheless, this still represented an impressive improvement for Democrats. Collins had beaten her previous challenger in 2014 by a stunning 37 points.
Democrats’ hubris in 2020 seemed to still haunt them as they began their do-over in 2026. Concerns exploded as scandal after scandal mounted for Democratic Senate nominee Graham Platner. The situation reached a breaking point in July when a sexual-assault allegation emerged, several high-profile backers pulled their support, and Platner ultimately dropped out. Notably, he did so before a deadline that allowed the Maine Democratic Party to appoint a replacement.
Enter fifth-generation logger Troy Jackson, former president of the Maine Senate, who represented a Trump-voting district as a progressive Democrat and recently lost the Democratic primary for governor in a tight race. In many ways, Jackson represents a more palatable version of Platner: a middle-aged white guy from rural Maine selling a brand of left-wing economic populism.
While Democrats breathed a resounding sigh of relief after replacing Platner on the ballot, they weren’t about to count their chickens. Their proverbial white whale remained, and with a newfound gust of Democrats-in-disarray wind in her sails.
Two months after the replacement, polling offers little comfort to Democrats. At the time of writing, Jackson leads Collins by roughly 2–3 points; a narrow margin in the Era of Polling Errors. While polling has generally been more accurate in recent elections without Trump on the ballot, it’s hard not to wonder whether there’s a Collins effect as well. In 2020, Maine’s presidential polls missed by only about 2.5 points, compared with a roughly 12-point error in the Senate race.
Additionally, Collins has been hitting the campaign trail hard. She has hosted 29 campaign events to Jackson’s 28, raised roughly $19 million, and done seven interviews. She has even managed to raise an additional $10 million in outside contributions from nearly 100 of her closest billionaire friends.
Despite it all, Collins may be facing her toughest match yet. For all her attempts to brand herself as an above-the-fray bipartisan, we now live in a time when politics are more nationalized than ever. Across the past three presidential elections, 94% of Senate races were won by the party that also carried the state for president. All to say, if you thought Kamala was Brat in 2024, you are less likely than ever to turn around and vote Republican for Senate.
That’s tough for a Republican in a state Harris won by 7 points in a R+1.5 national environment. And if we humor the polls for a moment, the national environment at the time of writing sits around D+6-7, or about 9-10 points to the left of 2024.
Of course, national swings don’t hit every state uniformly. The country could be considerably bluer this year because of increased turnout in cities or reversions among Hispanic and Asian voters, trends that may translate poorly to the second-most-rural and third-whitest state in the country. Nonetheless, a 7-point Democratic presidential margin is already a substantially blue baseline, and while the magnitude of the political shift is open for debate, the environment is likely to be much bluer this year.
To which you might argue: Collins has done it before. Surely she can do it again.
But has anything else changed since 2020?
In 2022, the Supreme Court overturned the right to choose established by Roe v. Wade. Collins, who describes herself as supportive of abortion rights, was a key vote in confirming Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court in 2018. As one of the five justices who voted to scrap Roe and nearly five decades of judicial precedent, his confirmation was pivotal, thus tightly implicating Collins in this historically unpopular ruling.
This past April, Collins cast the deciding vote for a Republican-backed plan providing $70 billion in funding for immigration enforcement agencies. The measure funds ICE for the next three years without any reforms such as requiring judicial warrants before agents enter private homes. Just three months later, 25-year-old Johan Sebastián Durán Guerrero was shot and killed by an ICE agent in Biddeford, Maine, sparking immediate community outrage and protests.
Other controversial votes, including support for HHS Secretary RFK Jr., association with the Trump administration’s tariffs that have hit Maine particularly hard because of its close economic ties with Canada, and her initial support for the president’s increasingly unpopular war in Iran, have likely contributed to her deteriorating approval rating and cross-party appeal. As of the most recent estimates by Morning Consult, her disapproval rating sits at 54%, the second-highest of any senator in the country.
This has certainly been one of the most interesting Senate races of 2026, and my uncalled-for hot take is that, polls be damned, Maine may actually be the sleeper sleeper race. The race nobody is sleeping on when, perhaps, you can in fact briefly snooze, as Jackson comfortably wins this November.
Wednesday, October 26, 2022
Can Democrats Defeat the Midterm Curse and Keep Control of Congress?
Roses are red,
make your selections,
the president's party loses during midterm elections...
...or so the adage goes.
An out-party win during midterm elections is one of the oldest features of U.S. politics, outliving several party realignments and surviving into the modern era. In fact, since 1934, the only midterm election in which the president's party gained in the generic congressional vote from the election prior was in 2002. George W. Bush was still atypically popular one year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The following graphic, which I lifted from FiveThirtyEight, spotlights this phenomenon.
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To read more about this pattern and theories for why it occurs—and to see the above graphic in a better resolution and in its original context—I encourage you to check out FiveThirtyEight's article by Geoffrey Skelley and Nathaniel Rakich discussing midterm losses. From here, I'm going to explore the idea that Democrats can defy this expectation in 2022.
Dobbs Rewrote the Script
Up until this summer, it seemed like there was no doubt that Democrats were going to fall to the midterm curse. Despite a resounding win in California's governor recall election in September 2021, Democrats significantly underperformed their 2020 results in regularly scheduled governor races later in the fall. In Virginia, Democrats lost by 2 points despite winning by a whopping 10 points just one year prior. Up in New Jersey, Democrats held on by 3 points, but the underperformance was just as stark—in 2020, Biden beat Trump in the Garden State by 16 points. As the year went on and turned into 2022, Democrats continued to poll poorly on the generic congressional ballot, trailing Republicans by 2-3 points.
However, the reason the question premised in this article can even be reasonably posed is due to a stunning reversal in Democrats fortunes after the notorious Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decision. The decision stripped American women of their constitutional right to privacy, bodily autonomy, and the right to choose, on a 6-3 party-line vote, with the GOP-appointed justices voting in favor. Soon, the media was flooded with horrifying stories of 10-year-olds who were raped and impregnated traveling over state lines to terminate their pregnancies, and of adult women whose lives were threatened by ectopic pregnancies and inaction by healthcare providers who feared legal retribution.
The backlash to the GOP was swift. In Kansas, the decision was rebuked when an August referendum to remove the right to an abortion from the state constitution lost by an incredible 18 points. In congressional races, similar ripple effects were seen. On June 28, just four days after the Dobbs decision was announced, Democrats narrowly lost a special election in Nebraska's 1st congressional district. However, NE-01 is 17 points more Republican than the baseline congressional district, meaning that in a neutral political environment, a Republican should expect to win by 17 points. A generic ballot average of R+3 would predict a 20-point win for Republicans. Instead, Democrat Patty Pansing Brooks only lost by 5 points, a 12 point over-performance relative to the district's partisan lean. Democrats continued to do well in other special elections in Minnesota, New York, and even Alaska, where former state lawmaker Mary Peltola beat Sarah Palin by 3 points to become the first Democrat to represent Alaska in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1972—a state that Trump had just won by 10 points two years ago. Altogether, Democrats in these elections over-performed relative to their districts' partisan leans by between 6 and 18 points.
What did the polling say about these elections?
Unlike 2016 and 2020, polling in these special elections underestimated Democrats by-and-large. In Kansas, for example, polling suggested the referendum would pass by 4 points, underestimating the final result by an absurd 22 points. In NY-19 not a single poll portended Pat Ryan beating Marc Molinaro. In fact, even a Democrat internal poll had Pat Ryan losing by 3 points, when he ended up winning by over 2 points. (Partisan internal polls tend to overestimate their candidate to generate buzz and encourage donations). In NE-01, the only non-partisan poll underestimated Democrats by 4 points. NY-23 and MN-01 unfortunately weren't polled, and the only pollster who surveyed Alaska was actually quite accurate in predicting the election results. For what it's worth, this same pollster, Alaska Survey Research, is predicting a blow-out for Peltola in November. Meanwhile, generic ballot polling shifted a few points in the Democrats direction over the summer, with their lead peaking at 1.9 points on September 19. This is in stark contrast to the results Democrats were putting up in these elections, which looked not even like 2020, but like the D+8 environment in 2018.
Altogether, this is great news for Democrats, because we know that special elections are strongly predictive of general election results. Moreover, these races now present the interesting scenario of a potential Democrat underestimation—an outcome that most forecasters would be quicker to jump out a window than to predict, after getting burnt so badly in 2016 and 2020.
However, it's important to remember that special elections are also just a single tool that is used to predict elections outcomes. While the data shown here point in a very clear direction, other indicators like presidential approval, economic conditions, and historical patterns all point the other way. It's also worth noting that these special elections were all in the northern US and not in particularly diverse geographies at that, so performances here cannot be extrapolated to a national context—the same goes for the performance of the polls. In the meantime, the winds seem to be reversing course yet again. Republicans have regained their lead in generic ballot polling, and you don't have to go far to find renewed "red wave" discourse. In the end, Republicans could very well be in for a satisfying November. If these special elections are any clue, though, it is more likely that it's the Democrats who will be underestimated this cycle.
Monday, November 2, 2020
2020 isn't 2016, but Trump could still win
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| Screenshot of the New York Times’s election needle, taken by Vox’s Libby Nelson at 11:15pm Eastern on the night of the 2016 presidential election. |
Donald Trump winning the presidential election is unlikely. But, it's a possibility. If you look at elections forecasters like 538, the Economist, or Plural Vote, a Donald Trump win is 4-35% likely—non-zero odds. Even a 4% win chance is slightly more likely than the probability of there being a full moon tonight. When folks hear numbers like those, though, it is hard not to remember 2016 when several forecasters gave Hillary Clinton ridiculously high win chances—like the HuffPost, who assigned Clinton a 98.2% chance of winning. However, there are several factors in this race that make it fundamentally different from 2016 in ways that bode poorly for Trump.
First, let's revisit 2016. Eleven days before Election Day, FBI Director James Comey reopened an investigation into Clinton's emails. While the polls were generally turbulent throughout the cycle, the letter likely contributed to a last-minute narrowing of the race from about a 6 point Clinton lead to a 3 point lead. Even then, the race still had large numbers of undecided and third-party voters, probably owed in part to the fact that Clinton and Trump were historically unpopular nominees. These undecided voters broke heavily for Trump, often by 20+ point margins in battleground states, when it came time to vote. This dynamic on its own made polling less predictive—what can a pollster do about surveying someone who has not made up their mind yet? Then, there was also a systemic polling error that disproportionately impacted the accuracy of polls in northern battleground states. In 2016, we learned educational attainment strongly correlates not only with a respondent's willingness to talk to a pollster on the phone, but also their voting intention. Thus, because Trump performed especially well with the non-college educated white voters who were less likely to complete election surveys, his support was famously understated in states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In Wisconsin, for example, RealClearPolitics's polling average overestimated Clinton's margin by a whopping 7.2 points. On the other hand, national popular vote polls withstood the many quirks of 2016 and were actually quite accurate, leading to the Electoral College-popular vote mismatch that handed Trump the presidency.
Thinking about 2020 again, we can see a completely different race. Joe Biden has held a steady lead in averages of the national popular vote the entire cycle, unlike the volatility seen in 2016. There are also far fewer undecided and third-party voters going into Election Day. Importantly, Biden is polling at 50%+ in the Trump-won Rust Belt states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, meaning he doesn't need to bank any voters who are not already firmly in his column to win. These states are notable because they are among the likeliest "tipping point" states, i.e. the states most likely to deliver the 270th electoral vote and decide the election. Moreover, Biden's favorability numbers are much stronger than Trump's (and Clinton's in 2016, for that matter). Biden has actually grown his net favorability from about +0 at the beginning of the race to +6 now, according to Morning Consult. This could be due in part to Biden's success at presenting himself as a moderate. Trump's net favorability, on the other hand, has stayed around -10 to -15 for most of the cycle. Trump's path to victory becomes that much more complicated, as he needs to do even better with undecided voters this time around, and also convert a few Biden voters—all the while running against a much better-liked competitor. Moreover, Trump is unlikely to be able to count on the same polling error that saved him in 2020. Many pollsters revised their polling methods for the 2018 midterm elections to weight for education in their samples, and it was one of the strongest years for the polls in awhile.
However, it is not all sunshine and roses for Team Biden. While he has an impressive 8.4 point lead in an average of national polls, there is no national election—rather, there are 50 simultaneous state elections, and the winner is decided by the Electoral College. And Biden's lead in the likeliest tipping point state, Pennsylvania, is only 4.8 points. If a 2016-size polling error occurred in 2020, Biden's lead would shrink to 0.4 points. For the reasons mentioned above, it is unlikely that the polls will be off this year in the same way they were in 2016—not only that, they have to be even more wrong than in 2016 because of Biden's impressive lead. They would also have to be biased against Republicans across a variety of geographies and demographics, because of Biden's leads in North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, and Arizona. It is possible that such a polling error exists, it is just very unlikely—hence Trump's roughly 10% chance of winning.
At the end of the day, there is a lot more on the ballot tomorrow than just the presidential race! The House seems to be all but a lock for Democrats. The race for control of the Senate is shaping up to be quite competitive, and the precise margin of control will be important in determining what either party will be able to accomplish. I wrote a piece back in July in which I discussed the competitive Senate races this cycle—the only caveat I would add is that South Carolina's Senate race has become more competitive since, but otherwise, it is a good overview. There are dozens of ballot initiatives across the country, ranging from raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour in Florida, to changing the voting system in Massachusetts (check your state here!). Control of state government is up for grabs in a number of states, which will have major implications for not only policy setting, but also creating Congressional districts for the next decade.
In the meantime, do not discount any possibility within the realm of reason from occurring tomorrow. As easy as it is, and as much as we would like to, we cannot change probabilities into a binary by rounding them up or down. 10% is not 0%. 90% is not 100%. Also, do not expect the race to be decided on election night–results could take until the end of November to be fully settled as mail ballots are counted. Finally, I did not even touch upon the possibility of drawn-out legal battles leaving the race undecided for days or even weeks. Trump has signaled that he intends to contest any election result that shows him losing, and has spent months attacking the integrity of U.S. elections. For now, just make sure you keep on breathing, and make your vote count!
Sunday, September 20, 2020
A Supreme Court Vacancy and the 2020 Election: Kavanaugh Part 2?
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| Ruth Bader Ginsburg's 1993 swearing-in ceremony. @Yahoo |
On September 18 at 7:32pm ET, the AP reported that Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was dead. Justice Ginsburg was known for her trailblazing legacy in the legal world as a fierce advocate for women's rights. Throughout her 27-year tenure, she became famous for her scathing dissents. Among her most notable opinions was her dissent in the 2007 ruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. In a rare move, she read aloud her opinion at the bench, decrying what she saw as judicial activism working in favor of gender discrimination in the work place. Two years later, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was passed by Congress and a framed copy hung in Ginsburg's chambers.
Her passing lays to rest one of the most remarkable careers in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court. It also leaves the Supreme Court with a 5-3 conservative majority and Donald Trump with the opportunity to nominate a third justice in his first term. In a striking abandonment of the precedent they established in 2016 after Justice Antonin Scalia died, Republicans have made clear they intend to move forward with a nomination before the election.
In order to stop a Trump-appointed justice from being confirmed by the Senate, the 47 members of the Democratic Caucus would need to be joined by 4 members of the GOP. Who exactly these four members could potentially be is uncertain. So far, the only GOP senator to say the vacancy should be filled by the winner of the election in November is Senator Susan Collins of Maine. Senator Lisa Murkowski from Alaska is likely to join her. Other possible defectors include institutionalists Mitt Romney and Chuck Grassley, retiring Senators Lamar Alexander and Pat Roberts, and those with tough reelection bids like Cory Gardner. Furthermore, the Arizona Senate race is a special election in which the winner would be sworn in by the end of November. If Democrat Mark Kelly wins and replaces Republican Martha McSally, which is looking likely, this makes the math a little easier for Democrats if they need to block a confirmation during a lame duck session.
What effect will the vacancy have on the election?
Historically, the Supreme Court has been more effective at motivating Republican voters than Democrats. In 2018, many consider the Brett Kavanaugh confirmation process to have tanked Democrats' chances in a number of red state Senate races—namely Missouri, Indiana, North Dakota, and Tennessee. The process riled up the parties' bases and curtailed the crossover appeal that red state Democrats needed to win. That said, other red state Democrats like Jon Tester of Montana and Joe Manchin of West Virginia managed to hold on by narrow margins.
However, it is not clear that this go around will follow the same patterns. First, even before Ginsburg passed away, polling showed that the Supreme Court is motivating Democrats more than Republicans this year. Moreover, polling done over the weekend has already shown that Americans are not as divided on this issue as the beltway—62% of Americans, including half of Republicans, think that the vacancy should be filled by whoever wins the November election.
If Trump and McConnell do indeed try to ram through a Supreme Court nomination, public opinion suggests there could be a backlash against the GOP. Given that a 6-3 conservative majority Supreme Court poses legitimate risks to the status of legal abortion in the U.S., this could hurt the GOP in some libertarian-leaning red states like Alaska and Montana, both of which have competitive Senate races this cycle. A 2014 Pew poll showed that 63% of Alaskans and 56% of Montanans support legal abortion in all or most cases—far higher than the 36% and 35%, respectively, of voters who supported Clinton in 2016. This same theory would suggest, though, that Democrats would now have worse odds in states like South Carolina and Alabama, where support for abortion hangs at 42% and 37%.
For GOP Senators trailing in their reelection bids in blue states, namely Susan Collins of Maine and Cory Gardner of Colorado, a floor-vote could present a massive opportunity. A defection could net them the cross-party support that they will need to win, and if polling holds, it seems as though GOP voters would not hold it against them too strongly either. However, a party-line vote could sink any remaining chance they have of securing those much needed votes from the left. Considering that Collins has come out early against a pre-election nomination, polling might soon reflect a shift in the race, but a floor-vote might be necessary to really shake things up.
Democratic Senators running in red states, on the other hand, seem as though they will carry less of the burden on this issue. Not only does the polling suggest that there is significant support across parties for a post-election nomination, but also none of the red state Democrats running are incumbents that would have to act in a floor vote. However, if public opinion does shift (which it often does in response to messaging from the top), we might see something similar to what occurred in 2018: party bases are riled up, and crossover appeal is tossed out the window. This could all but tank Democrats' chances in states like Kansas, South Carolina, Kentucky, and Alabama, although many would argue that Democrats may never have had a chance to begin with in these states.
It is too soon to tell what effects this will have on the presidential race. Will Democrats be disproportionately motivated and surge to the polls? Will enthusiasm for this issue fade in the face of an "October surprise" or perhaps a major spike in Covid cases? Will Donald Trump and Senate Republicans push back a floor vote into a lame duck session to protect Senate incumbents from a difficult vote? Not to mention, whoever Donald Trump nominates will come with their own set of headlines that will distract voters' attention. At the very least, it presents an opportunity for Donald Trump. Because he currently trails Biden by a wide margin, Trump likely loses in a no-news race. A major shake-up offers him a fighting chance.
Sunday, August 16, 2020
Congressional Races I'm Watching in the Massachusetts Primary

Massachusetts' 1st Congressional District

Massachusetts' 4th Congressional District
- Alan Khazei, 2010 candidate for Senate and CEO of City Year. Endorsed by Senator Michael Bennet, Congressman Jamie Raskin, and Susan Rice.
- Becky Grossman, Newton City Councilor. Endorsed by Congressman Ro Khanna, MA State Senate Majority Leader Cynthia Creem, and Julian Castro.
- Ihssane Leckey, former Wall Street regulator. Endorsed by Congresswoman Ilhan Omar.
- Jake Auchincloss, Newton City councilor, veteran, and former Republican political organizer. Endorsed by The Boston Globe and VoteVets.
- Jesse Mermell, former advisor to Deval Patrick and Brookline Select Board Member. Endorsed by Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley, MA Attorney General Maura Healey, and former contender David Cavell.
Massachusetts' U.S. Senate Election



